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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah

fi,\'ION PACIFIC RAILROAD

COMPANY, a Corporation,
Plaintiff
-vs.-

~T"\'l'E

Case No.
10710

TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant

Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing

S'l'ATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE
PETITION
This is a Petition for Rehearing of the Court's
ll'l'ision on the ground the Court not only committed
c·nor i11 cone 1uding that the word "commercial" in
~r·etion 59-l:i-4 (b) (2), U.C.A., 1953, (the statute innh·ll) is unambiguous and clear, but also in failing or
1··f11>ing to recognize the legislative meaning as estab'i,hed br the undisputed and stipulated facts in the

1

i'1·1·1mi.

DISPOSITION BEFORE THE
UTAH SUPREME COURT

In its decision filed March 13, 1967, the Court
I
that "the legislature intended to exclude from tax 1; I
fuel oil which industrial concerns use in the busines' ri;
fabricating merchandise which, when completed, wuni,:
be subject to a sales tax and that a sales tax is intcnr]1,
to be imposed on railroads which are primarily r111rn~11'
in commerce, that is, in trade rather than industn,, nr
in the fabrication of merchandise.''
,

1

1

On the basis of that holding the Court ordmrl 1lw'
the determination of the State Tax Commission L
affirmed.
RELIEF SOUGHT BY PETITION FOR REHEARm
Plaintiff seeks ( 1) a reversal of the erroneous ro1;
struction placed by this Court on the statute involrerl,.
to-wit, that "commercial" includes all "trade" (rail·!
roads are considered to be in trade rather than industry!
and that the "industrial" exemption is limited to tl1
fabrication of merchandise; and (2) a ruling, in arro1 i
ance with the intent of the legislature, that the raihwl
industry in Utah is exempt from the sales aml use t111 ·
on its purchase and storage of fuel oil for the propul,iu
of locomotives.
1

1

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The material facts of this case are the suhjerl ,it
stipulation set out in the record at pages 7 through i:

3
n• dig-l'sted in plaintiff's brief at pages 2 through 9.
they are not again recited herein .

,,,,,] ; 1

1,. 1.,,rdi11gly

.\RGll~IENT AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PE'l ITION FOR REHEARING
1

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Bcra11sP of the substantial effeC't of the Court's de:i~ion in this casP on all railroads doing business in this
·'';111·, 1'1ir• Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad
l'ompan~-. Ronthern Pacific Company and "\Vestern Pa,jfir Hnilroacl Company, whiC'h, along ·with plaintiff, con,(itntc all of the Class I railroad companies doing busiliPR~ in TTtah, petitioned the Court for leave to file an
n111ir1 rnrioe liri0f in support of plaintiff's Petition for
R0hc·nring. B)- rourt order dated March 30, 1967, said
11etitioners were granted such leave. Accordingly, they
lwreli~- join with Union Pacific Railroad Company in the
frillo1ring arg-11mcut and brief in support of plaintiff's
i'ctitio11 for Hehcaring.
POINT I
THJ1~

COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

THFJ R'I' A TUTE INVOLVED IN THIS CASE
IR CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS.

2 of its green sheet decision, the Court
'i:ib: "\V0 do not think there is any ambiguity in the
·1nt11t" im·oh-Pcl herein."
On

p<t\!,'P

.\g-;1i11,

11 'r 11l1i1·li

on page :3: "It is not any ambiguity in the
f.(iYrf' the occasion for this lawsuit, but it is

4

the application of the facts to the law whirh bring:;; 11 1,.
matter to the court's attention."
We respectfully disagree with these staterne 11 1,
In fact, and entirely contrary to the court's concln~io1t.
plaintiff has proceeded under the conviction that (1
main reason for this lawsuit was the ambiguity iu
the meaning of the word ''commercial,'' and thcrefori·
to apply the proper definition to that term as it appear,
in and is a part of Se0tion 59-15-4 (b) (2), UCA, 1933, :,
is necessary to look to all available and proper sonrn
to determine and carry out ·what the legislature ltarl i11
mind. By its nature the term "commercial" can de11ol1
as broad or as narrow a meaning of business as 1rn,
wishes to ascribe to it. The fact that it inherently prr:.
duces more than one interpretation is aptly pointed on1
by reference to the Tax Commission's "flip flop" aJ :
ministrative constructions over the past twenty-tw•
years. (R. 20, 21, 23)
,
1

1

The wide gamut of meanings and senses which th
term is capable of producing, and has produced (and t!P
creation of an ambiguity or uncertainty of meaning re
quires only two variable interpretations) is graphicall:
illustrated by the definitions of "commercial" in fa\
Corpus Juris Secundum, pages 1 and 2:
''The word 'comercial' is defined as menrn 11 ~
mercantile· occupied with commerce; relati11!.! 1"
or dealing 'with commerce; of the nature of c~ni
1
merce; of or pertaining to commerce; pe.~-t_a,m1 ~ ,;
or relating to commerce or trade; deincd. ·
commerce or trade ; engaged in trade; han 11 ~
financial profit as the primary aid.

5
"The term 'commercial,' in its broad sense
comprehends all business and industrial enterprises, and in a comprehensive sense it includes
ocrnpations and recognized forms of business enterprise which do not necessarily involve trading
in merchandise as well as buying, selling, and exchange in the general sales or traffic of ( Ameriran) markets, although, when limited to the purchase and sale or exchange of goods and commodities, it is said to be used in a narrow and
restricted sense. Thus it has been said that in its
narrow sense it includes only those enterprises
which are engaged in the buying and selling of
g-oods. It has also been said that there is nothing- erroneous or irrational in interp·reting the
word 'commercial' as including farming activities.
"Used in a broad sense, it includes 'industrial,'
ancl iR sometimes synonymous with 'business.'"
Apart from general definitions, the cases have uniform]~- recognized the indistinct and questionable meani11g: of the term "commercial" as it appears in innumerable shitntes and ordinances throughout the country.
-incl, npon Rneh recognition the courts involved haYe
rarefnlly reviewed the legislative background invoh-ed
aml wn1ilahle in order to arrive at the proper legislative
intrnt. For example, the court prefaced its consideration
ufthe meaning of "commercial" in Reiser v. Meyer, 323
SW 2J G14, 521 (1\fo., 1959), as follows:
''A reading of the cases shows that the term
'commercial' or the phrase 'commercial purposes'
are not susceptible of exact definition. They are
gi1-en different meanings under varying circumstanees and depend on the circumstances under
which they are used.''
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Similarly, in United States v. Public 8ercice (' 1, , .
Colorado, 143 F. 2d 79 (10th Cir., 1944), at page 81, 11 11 •
court said:
"The term 'commercial' may have a hroatl 111
a narrow meaning. In its broad meaIJing it rm·rim
passes industrial enterprises or all hnsiness. Jii
the narrow meaning of the term 'commerl'ial' j,
included only those enterprises engaged in tl
buying and selling of goods. The legislafae l1i'.
tory ... would indicate that Congres8 wa~ usi11~
the word 'commercial' in the re8trictrd Nl'l1i1
rather than the broad sense.''
1

In Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 49 S.Ct. 4i, i.~
L.Ed 214 (1928), at page 127 the court says:
"While in a narrow and restricted sense tl:i
terms 'commerce,' or 'commercial,' and 'trndt
may be limited to the purchase and sale or •
change of goods and commodities, they may con
note, as well, other occupations and other rero~
nized forms of business enterprise which do wJ'
necessarily involve trading in merchandise."
1
\

And, in Colorado Contractors Ass'n v. Public [.'/iii '
ties Commission, 262 P.2d 266 (Colo., 1953), the couJ'i', •
analysis is as follows:
" 'Commercial' pertains to commerce .... Tl 11 ~
term 'commerce,' it is said, is not susceptihlr 111
exact or comprehensive definition, and the qn«'
tion of what is commerce is to be approached bot!
affirmatively and negatively. 11 Am ..Jur. i.' 1
C.J.S. Commerce, Section 1, page 256. It is g"11 ''
different meanings under varying cireumsla 1'."'.
1
in the interpretation of certain statutes allll il 1'
111
trines. It has been stretched out of all )ll'l'1'
tion in some instances and contracte d ·m otlJ1 r·
1

7
fn the main, it should be declared to mean that
which the legislature had in mind by its use in
t lie particular statute under consideration."
Sec also City of Sioux Falls v. Claeland, 75 S.D .

.i±8, 70 N.W. 2d 62, 64 ( S.D., 1955) ; State ex rel. J( arnsas
('dlf Poirer & Light Company v. Smith, 342 Mo. 75, 111
S.W. (2<1) 513 (Mo. 1938); and Mecha1iical Farm Equip111e1if Distributors v. Porter, 156 F. 2d 296 (9th Cir.1946).
Based upon the foregoing consideration of the crititerm imTolved, it is difficult to see how the court arriwd at its view that the statute in this case is clear and
rPrtnin. ArJparently it follows from the comments on
pnge 2 of the green sheet, which state:

l"<tl

''Fuel oil and coal are taxed only if sold or
furnished for domestic or commercial consumption. We would not expect the legislature to predetermine whether or not any given concern was
engaged in domestic or commercial activity. That
is a factual question to be initially determined by
the 'l1ax Commission and ultimately by this
court.''
While that statement may be true with respect to
the proprr application of the legislative intent on a case-

1,!"·case hasis, it completely slides over and leaves un~ll~\1·erec1 the critical issue in this case: What did the
l't:1li lcgi:o;latnre mean by the phrase "furnished for ...
1
' Jtmner('ial eonsumption'' ~
\Yliilc eouccding that the legislature is not expected
'j .
r ce1r r rn advance whether or not any or every con1 111
' '
i.~ eommercial in nature, where that body has set

Ir1

j

8

tlown a meaningful legislative definition of that otlin.
wise questionable term, which is clearly delineate11 iii tJ,,
legislative history and has thereby established a stmlllard under which the Tax Commission and the Court ('<Iii
apply the legislative intent to a gi,'en situation, m~ 111 _
lieve it is error for this Court to conclude that the statuti
is clear and then substitute its own views for thosr i:r
the legislature.
And, in substituting its own views as to what tl1~
legislature intended, we believe the court has committed
further error for the follo-vving reasons: First, the scupt
and meaning of the exclusion from the statute inrolnrl
was determined solely by resorting to the dictionary.
Second, the Comi held that the legislature intended t11
exclude from the broadest definition of "commercial."
which includes all business activity, only that aspre:
falling within the term ''industrial.'' (Green Sheet, pag1"
4) Thus, instead of interpreting "commercial" the Corn:
turns to the construction of the word "industrial" t1'
decide this case.
This approach makes the sole basis of statuton ,.,,;
struction in Utah a literal reading of the dictionary
places an impossible burden on the legislative drnft·
man. If he does not include his own definition of term'
in the statute he is bound bv Webster despite whatrn 1
'
.
extrinsic eddence is available as to what the lrg-islatiw
was trying to do.
Such an approach has also produced in thi~ ca:--1'/
overly restricted and unduly limited area of exrilll' 11 ' ·

9

l1r :qipl:·ing a strict construction to !he term "indus1ri1ii," i.c>., fabrication of merchandise, and a very broad
,) 1·fi11ition to
"commercial," i.e., all business activity
1\rept fabrication. This is the nry antithesis of the
;1pplicatio11 of normal and customary rules of statutory
1·1111structio11 to tax statutes. And, the upshot is the
1·rro11Pons placement of the railroad industry into the
"1·nmrnercial" category.
ln cases of this kind the Court is to construe the
l;1i1piage imposing the tax strictly against the taxing
:111thority and, should "resolve doubts in favor of the
tnxpnyrr." The Ogden Union Railway and Depot Com11011.11 v. State Tax Commission, 16 Utah 2d 23, 395 P.2d
jj (l1tah, 1964).
Iii his dissenting opm10n to the Commission's
1lecision, Commissioner Gunther succinctly and clearly
<inalp~es this point at page 72 of the Record where he
>tnte~:

''It appears .fo me that sales tax upon coal,
fuel oil and other fuel is not a tax of general
imposition with specific and defined exemption,
hut rather, because of the peculiar wording of the
sretions of the Sales Tax Act relating to these
substances, a tax of limited imposition. The
Legislature in Section 59-15-4, Utah Code Annotated, Hl53, did not define the areas of exemption
hut rather defined in the following language the
arpa of taxation:
'' (a) The sale of coal, fuel oil and other fuels
shall not be subject to the tax except
as hereinafter provided.

10

"(b) (2) To any person as d e f"med i11 thi,
act including municipal corporati 1J1,.
for gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel ni!
or other fuels sold or furnished f111
domestic or commercial rons11m11ti1J)!,

''If the Legislature had intended to hroa!]p 11
the tax to include such activities as those pvr
formed by the railroad in this case, it could ra,ih
have done so by imposing- a tax and defining- are,1.
of exemption. This it did not do. Therefore. 1111 _
der general rules of tax statute constructio11, tb1
tax imposition, being specific, must be stridl1
construed.
·
"Because this tax is of limited and enrefnlh
defined imposition, it necessarily follows that an;
uncertainty or ambiguity as to whether or 11nt
imposition is appropriate in a given fact situatio11
must needs be resolved in fayor of the taxpa)tr
and against the taxing authority."

It would appear to us that in applying the customan
rule of statutory construction, the Court should pr011t·rh
consider "commercial" in its strict sense and "indu;
trial" in its broad sense, or in a reverse orclur to th
method which was followed by this Court.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
CONSIDER OR IN IGNORING THE STIPULATED FACTS IN THE RECORD WHICH
ESTABLISH THAT THE LEGISLATUm;
INTENDED TO EXCLUDE THE BUSINES~
OF RAILROADING FROM THE scorJ>;
AND MEANING OF THE WORD "COMMERCIAL" IN THE STATUTE.

11

'l'lw OJH'11i11g remarks on the first page of The United
.\lalr8 J,a11 Week, for the week of March 21, 1967, 34
L\\'. :;:32;), state:
1

"Mr. Justice Holmes once wryly commented
that in a moment of indiscretion he had told counsel arguing the intention of the legislature that
'I don't care what their intention was. I only
11 ant to know what the words mean.' "
Without intending any disrespect, it would appear
!!tat the Court's Opinion in this case is a very apt illus1 mt ion of ~fr. J usticc Holmes' comment. After reaching
the erroneous conclusion that the statute is clear and
rertai11, the Court has no difficulty in brushing aside
lltr facts in the record which establish, insofar as
llH' present ease is eoncerned, exactly what the legislature had in mind in its enactment of Chapter 93, Laws
111' rtalt 1948. Instead, the Court looks to the dictionary
for the mraning of the words.
While refm;ing to recognize the facts in the record,
1li1.· Court rather incongruously expresses interest in
knowing "·lint "·as said by the sponsors of and the comu1ittccs whielt urged passage of the hill. It is, of course,
11 l'll known that statements of sponsors of bills and comrnittPr·s Of rtah legislatures have never been permanently
lN·unled until recent times, and therefore such informaliri11 i~ not arnilable in the present case. It is difficult
11
' lliJf]erstand how that type of legislative history would
1
' Hrwptahlc> to the Court, while the facts in the record,
1111
id1 are jnst as meaningful, would not be acceptable.
1

'

In a case where a statute is, in fact, clear 011 its fa['i•.
we would agree that the meaning should be derived frum
looking to the ordinary and every-day meanings of tliP
statutory language. On the other hand, however, whw
the language in a statute is not clear, as in the presi•nt
case, as has been demonstrated under Point I, it would ,
appear that the Court should properly consider all 11f
the available legislative background material. I'coy,
Board of Ediication of Provo City School District, ]j
Utah 2d 63, 377 P. 2d 490 (Utah, 1962); and Cil11 11!
Mesa v. Killingsworth, 394 P. 2d 410 (Ariz., 196Ji
See also Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 17 Utah 2i!
337, 410 P. 2d 831, (Utah, 1966), which recitPs the 1Jn~i1
overriding rule in the interpretation of every statute
"Wnat was the intent of the legisbture? All of tl11
rules of statutory construction are subordinate to it nl!ll
are helpful only insofar as they assist in attaining tk:
objective."
The sta.tute with which we are concerned in tlii'
case was enacted in its present form as Chapter 0:.
Laws of Utah, 1943, effective March 18, 1943. (R. lR
That ·was the first time that the exemption for non
commercial consumption was afforded to solid fu(!'
The amendment was for the purpose of remori1 1 ~
the discrimination which has resulted to Utah
producers, fuel oil producers, and other fuels pr"
ducers from the tax on the sales of such coal, fuel cii!
'
and other fuels made for reasons other than dornem
or commercial. (R. 19) At that time the initial stahlf1• '
which was borrowed from the Federal Rrvenue Ad "
1932, had been on the statute books of this state for ori·'
1

.•
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if'11 Yenrs, and during that period there was a cleare11t
"ml uniform construction of the language of the statu~t>,
1iliieh clearly excluded railroads from the scope of "commercial cornmmption. ''

Page 19 of the Record includes the following stipu:ation of fact:
"In its consideration and enactment of Chapter 93, Laws of Utah, 1943, the legislature had
lief ore it and relied upon the prior construction
of the language, 'domestic and commercial consumption' as passed by it in the original enactment of the Emergency Revenue Act of 1933, and
as amended, together with the Commission's regulations heretofore set forth which were issued in
definition and construction thereof by the Commission." (Emphasis Added)
,\ml ,,·hat was the construction of the original

amendment in 19331
Tlie tax imposed upon energy sold for commercial
consumption did not include energy sold to railroads.
1R. 13)
And what wa<> the Commission's regulation?
"All gas, electricity or heat furnished the consumer is taxable except: ...
''That furnished for other uses which likewise
cannot be classed as domestic or commercial, such
as ... railroads .... " (R. 17)
\\'l' ~nbmit that a reference to and the application
11

f ilie for0going facts from the legislative history of

Chapter 93 iR indispensable in establishing the proper
"'~i>lati\P intent in this case and that the Court was in
'
'iTiir in failillg to do so.
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CONCLUSION
All counsel involved in this case are fully a wan• 1]i;i'
this Court does not favor unwarranted use of reheariit"
procedures. Nevertheless, for the reasons diReuRser1 ii.
this brief, we believe this important a])(1 far n·Helti11 :
case deserves a rehearing. \Ve therefore n'spcctfulh
invoke further thought and reconsideration by the Co1111
on the points raised herein.

BRYAN P. LEVERICH
A. U. MINER
HO\VARD F. CORAY
SCOTT M. MATHESON
NORMANW. KETTNER
600 Union Pacific Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Plai1di11
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;.;rr .\ 'J'E:'.\rB~NT OF A:'.\IICI CURIAE
'l'he ulldersigned companies and eounsel have joinrd
;11 1lri,, lirid' not simply becanse of the effect the result
111 tlris l'HSC will have upon their respective operations,
l1n1 primarily heeause of the rules of law applied by the
1'11nrt. \Ye have not found persuasive authority which
1111lt1.s that a dictionary definition is entitled to greater
,,,.1g]i1 in statutory construction than established legisl:itin: iJ1tc11t eoupled with consistent administrative conmuction over a long period of time. The Court's decision
111 1liis e<1sc appears to be contrary to the main stream
ilr·ei~ioui:i arnl coneepts of long standing applied in Anglo:-111::011 jurisprudence.
Accordingly, we respectfully JOlll m the conclusion
:111rl urg-L' this ( 'ourt to grant the foregoing Petition.
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& McCARTHY
141 East First South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for The Denver and
Rio Gramde Western Railroad Co.
C. PRESTON ALLEN
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
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Attorneys for Southern Pacific
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PETER ·w. BILLINGS
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Continental Bank Building
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